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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of entries in the first
TAC Market Design Competition final that compares the en-
tries across several scenarios. The analysis complements
previous work analyzing the 2007 competition, demonstrat-
ing some vulnerabilities of entries that placed highly in the
competition. The paper also suggests a simple strategy that
would have performed well.
1. Introduction
Auctions are widely used in solving real-world resource
allocation problems, and in structuring stock and futures
exchanges. As a result, the field of auction mechanism
design has drawn much attention in recently years from
economists, mathematicians, and computer scientists [2,
10]. In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as
games of incomplete information, and traditional analytic
methods from game theory have been successfully applied
to some single-sided auctions, where a single seller has
goods for sale and multiple buyers bid for the goods, and
some simple forms of double-sided auctions (DAs), where
there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers and both sides
may make offers or shouts.
However, as, for example Friedman [6], has pointed out,
DAs, and particularly continuous double auctions (CDAs),1
are too complex to analyze in this way since at every mo-
ment, a trader must compute expected utility-maximizing
shouts based on the history of shouts and transactions, and
the time remaining in the auction. This difficulty led re-
searchers to seek experimental approaches. Smith [18] pi-
oneered this field and showed, through a series of exper-
iments with human subjects, that even CDAs with just a
handful of traders can give high efficiency and quick con-
vergence to the theoretical equilibrium. Software agents
1A CDA is a continuous DA in which any trader can accept an offer and
make a deal at any time during the auction period.
armed with various learning algorithms and optimization
techniques have been shown to produce outcomes similar
to those obtained by human subjects [4, 9] and are capable
of generating higher individual profits [5].
In parallel with the automation of traders, computer sci-
entists have started to take the approach of automated auc-
tion mechanism design. Thus, Cliff [3] used a genetic al-
gorithm to discover a completely new kind of auction with
good convergence properties. Phelps et al. [15] showed that
genetic programming can be used to find an optimal point
in a space of pricing policies. Niu et al. [13] identified
a mechanism that minimizes variation in transaction price,
confirming the mechanism through an evolutionary explo-
ration. Pardoe and Stone [14] suggested a self-adapting auc-
tion mechanism that adjusts auction parameters in response
to past auction results.
All this work has one common theme — it all studies sin-
gle markets or compares different market mechanisms indi-
rectly. In contrast, not only do traders in an auction compete
against each other, real market institutions face competition
[17]. In addition, previous studies usually present compar-
isons of auction mechanisms in different proprietary set-
tings which differ in available information, computational
resources and so on. As a result, mechanisms are difficult
to compare, and it is desirable to have some platform that
allows multiple markets to compete against each other, and
evaluates market mechanisms in a uniform way.
The Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Market Design
Tournament [7], also known as the CAT game, addresses
these very issues2. Prior TAC competitions have compet-
ing trading agents that aim to maximize their payoffs by
interacting in a single market. CAT games do just the oppo-
site. Each entrant in the competition provides a specialist
that regulates a market with a set of auction rules, and these
specialists compete against each other to attract traders and
make profits. Traders in CAT games are provided by the
competition platform and each of them learns to choose the
best market to trade in.
2The first competition was held in July 2007 and a second competition
was held in July 2008.
In a previous paper, we analyzed those entries from the
first CAT competition (CAT 2007) that are available in the
TAC agent repository3, and tried to identify effective auction
rules [12]. In this paper, we extend this previous work by
more closely examining the relative strength and weakness
of the specialist agents.
2. The CAT competition
CAT games are designed to allow markets to compete
against each other in a direct fashion. Each market serves a
set of traders, each of which makes shouts indicating either
what it is prepared to pay to buy some good (a bid), or what
it expects to be paid to sell such a good (an ask). A CAT
game lasts a certain number of days, each day consists of
rounds, and each round lasts a certain number of ticks, or
milliseconds.
Each trader is assigned private values for the goods it will
trade. For buyers, the private value is the most it will pay for
a good. For sellers, the private value is the least it will ac-
cept for a good. The private values and the number of goods
to buy or sell make up the demand and supply of the mar-
kets. Private values remain constant during a day, but may
change from day to day, depending upon the configuration
of the game server. Each trading agent is endowed with a
trading strategy and a market selection strategy. The first
specifies how to make offers, the second specifies which
market to choose to make shouts in.
Specialists facilitate trade by matching shouts and deter-
mining the trading price in an exchange market. Each spe-
cialist operates its own exchange market and may choose
its own auction rules — the aim of the CAT competition is
to create a specialist that optimizes a particular set of mea-
sures, including market share,4 profit share,5 and transac-
tion success rate.6 The specialist with the highest cumula-
tive score — the sum of these three metrics — is the winner
of a game. Specialists may have adaptive strategies such
that the policies change during the course of a game in re-
sponse to market conditions.
We, developed JCAT [11], the platform that is used in the
CAT competition.
2.1. Parameterized market mechanisms
An auction mechanism can be parameterized into com-
ponents that each regulates an aspect of the market. The
following gives a framework extending that in [22]:
3http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php.
4The number of traders attracted to the market relative to the total num-
ber of traders.
5The amount of profit made by a specialist relative to the total amount
of profit made by all the specialists in a game.
6The number of shouts matched by the market relative to the total num-
ber of shouts placed in the market.
• Matching policies define the set of matching offers in
a market at a given time.
• Quoting policies determine the ask quote and bid quote
— indicators of where traders need to place asks and
bid in order to trade — from existing asks and bids.
• Shout accepting policies judge whether a request by a
trader to place a shout in the market should be accepted
or rejected.
• Clearing conditions define when to clear the market
and execute transactions between matched shouts.
• Pricing policies are responsible for determining trans-
action prices for matched shouts.
• Charging policies determine the charges that a special-
ist imposes on traders using the market. In JCAT, a spe-
cialist can set fees for registration with a specialist, for
market information, for making an offer, for complet-
ing a transaction, and impose a tax on profits.
For example, the classic CDA mechanism is a combina-
tion of the following auction rules (without considering the
charging component): the market is cleared whenever a new
shout is placed; the market matches the highest bid with the
lowest ask that it exceeds; the pricing policy picks the mid-
point of a matched ask-bid pair; the quoting policy uses the
lowest unmatched ask as the ask quote and the highest un-
matched bid as the bid quote; and the shout accepting pol-
icy only accepts shouts that beat the corresponding market
quote.
2.2. A simple, but powerful market design
We developed MetroCat, a market mechanism that in-
stantiates this parameterized framework, based on the fol-
lowing insights about the CAT game.
• It is crucial to maintain a high transaction success rate,
since this rate is not immediately affected by the per-
formance of other markets in contrast to market share
and profit share. Thus a strong shout accepting policy,
which only allows those shouts that are likely to match
with other shouts, is desirable.
• Registration and information fees should be avoided,
for these fees cause losses to extra-marginal traders7
and drive them away. Keeping extra-marginal traders
in the market allows them to contribute through their
impact on market share.
7Traders that theory says should not trade at market equilibrium and
will not trade in efficient markets.
• Moderate charges on shouts, transactions, and trader
profit only impacts intra-marginal traders, and because
of this they stay with the market as long as they can
make a considerable amount of profit through transac-
tions after covering fees.
These insights led us to develop a CDA-based market mech-
anism, which uses a history-based shout accepting policy,
denoted as AH. AH is based on the GD trading strategy [8].
GD selects a price that maximizes expected payoff, assum-
ing that, for a given ask price a:
• if another ask price a′ < a was offered and was not
accepted by a seller, a would not be accepted either;
• if another ask price a′ > a was offered and accepted
by a seller, a would have been accepted as well; and
• if a bid price b > a was offered in the market, a would
have been accepted.
Based on these assumptions, the probability of a being
matched is calculated as:
Pr(a) =
∑
d≥a MA(d) +
∑
d≥a B(d)∑
d≥a MA(d) +
∑
d≥a B(d) +
∑
d≤a RA(d)
where: MA(d) is the number of asks with price d that have
been matched; RA(d) is the number of asks with price d
that were not matched, and B(d) is the number of bids with
price d. It is not realistic to keep a full history of shouts
and transactions, so GD maintains a sliding window and
only considers those shouts and transactions in the window.
Computed like this, Pr(a) is a monotonically decreasing
function, since the higher a is, the lower Pr(a). It is also as-
sumed that when a = 0.0, Pr(a) = 1, and there is a certain
value ua, when a > ua, Pr(a) = 0. The probability Pr(b)
of a given bid being accepted is computed analogously.
AH uses exactly Pr(a) and Pr(b) to estimate how likely
a shout is to be matched, and only accepts those shouts with
a probability higher than a specified threshold λ ∈ [0, 1].
When it is close to 1, the restriction may become too tight
for intra-marginal traders to be able to place shouts in the
market. When it is close to 0, the restriction may become
so loose that extra-marginal traders are able to place shouts
which do not stand much chance of being matched. The
former would cause both the market and the traders to lose
part of the expected profit and lead those traders to leave,
and the latter would cause a low transaction success rate.
MetroCat uses λ = 0.5, which we found to be optimal for
a game configuration similar to CAT 2007.
In addition to AH, MetroCat uses a simple charging pol-
icy that imposes low, fixed fees on shouts, transactions,
and trader profit, and no charges on registration and in-
formation8. Since we developed the competition platform,
MetroCat was not an entrant in the competition,9 but we
have used it as a benchmark in our post-competition exper-
iments.
3. The analysis of CAT entries
Trading competitions have been an effective tool in fos-
tering innovative approaches and advocating enthusiasm
and exchange among researchers [20, 21]. However, the
competitions themselves usually cannot provide a complete
view of the relative strength and weakness of entries. In a
competition, the performance of one player closely depends
upon the composition of its opponents and the competition
configuration, and the scenarios considered are usually lim-
ited. Thus we typically turn to post-competition analysis to
tell us which entries are most interesting.
Ideally, such an analysis will cover all possible scenar-
ios, but this usually presents too large a possible space. As
a result, a common practice is to deliberately select a lim-
ited number of representative strategies and run games cor-
responding to a set of discrete points in the infinite space,
assuming that the results are representative of what would
happen in the whole space were one to explore it [19].
There are two common types of approaches to post-
competition analysis; white-box approaches and black-box
approaches. A white-box approach attempts to relate the in-
ternal logic and features of strategies and game outcomes.
A black-box approach considers strategies as atomic enti-
ties. Niu et al. [12] performed a white-box analysis of CAT
2007, and examined how the dynamics in the CAT games
are affected by the policies of each entry and their adapta-
tion over time. This paper takes a complementary black-
box approach and also examines the weakness and strength
of CAT 2007 entries against MetroCat.
3.1. Multi-lateral simulation
Now, a full analysis of a set of strategies can only be
achieved by considering many runs (to eliminate random-
ness) of every possible combination of strategies. This
is not feasible for the CAT competition where each game
runs for around 5 hours (irrespective of the hardware —
the length of each trading days is hardcoded at a constant
that permits each specialist to take time to perform possibly
complex computations — any reduction in this time would
potentially distort the results). Inspired by ecological analy-
ses like [1, 16] — in which more copies of successful strate-
gies, and less copies of unsuccessful strategies are run for
8The fees MetroCat imposes on shouts, transactions, and trader profit
are respectively 0.1, 0.1, and 10% during the post-tournament experiments
described in later sections.
9Instead it was included in the JCAT source code provided to entrants
in the first CAT competition to support the development of their entries.
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Figure 1: Simulation of CAT 2007 entries based on multi-lateral CAT games.
each successive game — but constrained by the number of
specialists that we could have in a single game, we modified
each strategy’s playing time in proportion to its score. That
is, in a game that included all specialists, we decreased the
number of trading days for less successful strategies, and
increased the days for more successful strategies.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the result of this simula-
tion. The distribution on the y-axis shows the proportion
of the total number of trading days for all markets that
are allotted to each market, indicating how this evolves
in populations without and with MetroCat respectively.
Figure 1(a) shows that without MetroCat (i) the results
of this analysis agrees with the results reported in [12],
again confirming that IAMwildCAT was the strongest en-
trant in the 2007 competition; and (ii) the days allotted to
PersianCat shrink more slowly than those of other los-
ing specialists. This agrees with the results of bilateral
games between IAMwildCAT and PersianCat (described
below) and suggests that PersianCat was a strong en-
try. Figure 1(b) shows that with MetroCat (i) MetroCat
quickly dominates the other entries, doing so faster than
IAMwildCAT in Figure 1(a), and by generation 8 only
MetroCat has any trading days; and (ii) the CAT 2007
champion, IAMwildCAT, loses trading days faster than
other entrants after generation 1, indicating some weakness
in its design when facing an opponent like MetroCat.
3.2. Bilateral simulation
One-on-one games closely examine the strength and
weakness of a specialist when it faces different opponents.
As a result, we ran 81 experiments in total between the 9
specialists including MetroCat. Nine of these are self-play
games. Table 1 shows the resulting payoffs of specialists
— their average daily scores — in these CAT games. Each
payoff is averaged over 10 iterations and entry (i, j) is the
payoff of specialist i in the game against specialist j.
Figure 3 compares these payoffs pictorially using a polar
coordinate system. Each plot shows the 9 specialists evenly
distributed on the outer circle, the radial coordinates of the 9
vertices of the solid-line polygon represent a given special-
ist’s payoffs against all 9 specialists, and the radial coordi-
nates of the 9 vertices of the dashed-line polygon represent
its opponents’ payoffs in these games. The solid-line poly-
gon and the dashed-line polygon overlap on the vertex that
corresponds to the self-play game of the particular special-
ist. In Figure 3(a), the solid-line polygon completely en-
closes the dashed-line one, meaning MetroCat wins over
all the other 8 specialists in bilateral competitions10. Fig-
ure 3(i) shows the opposite situation in that Mertacor loses
all the games. The two polygons for any other specialist in-
tersect somehow, showing their advantages in some games
and disadvantages in others.
Both Figure 3(b) and 3(h) show that IAMwildCAT, the
CAT 2007 champion, surprisingly loses (although barely)
against PersianCat which placed sixth. This explains
why in Figure 1(a) the days for PersianCat shrink more
slowly than those for other specialists. IAMwildCAT’s
loss, given the defeat of PersianCat by PSUCAT and
jackaroo, suggests that IAMwildCAT has some particular
weakness that is taken advantage of by PersianCat.
Other discrepancies, when compared to the results of the
2007 competition, include jackaroo (which placed 4th)
winning over PSUCAT (2nd) and Crocodile (3rd). These
may be significant, or may be caused by differences in the
configurations for PSUCAT and Crocodile used in the sim-
10MetroCat maintains a better balance than those CAT 2007 entries
between market share and profit share by keeping extra-marginal traders
and preventing them from placing uncompetitive shouts.
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Figure 2: Simulation of CAT 2007 entries based on bilateral CAT games.
specialist Metro IAM PSU jack Croc MANX TacTex Persian Mertacor
MetroCat 0.6451 0.7134 0.7461 0.7804 0.8217 0.7524 0.8592 0.7773 0.8885
IAMwildCAT 0.5895 0.6568 0.7207 0.6793 0.7681 0.7070 0.8008 0.6145 0.7632
PSUCAT 0.5366 0.5687 0.6152 0.5534 0.6950 0.6121 0.6420 0.7409 0.8307
jackaroo 0.4786 0.5926 0.6989 0.6279 0.7537 0.7088 0.7839 0.6902 0.8602
CrocodileAgent 0.4357 0.5245 0.5420 0.5145 0.4865 0.4614 0.6210 0.5879 0.7257
MANX 0.5383 0.5930 0.6067 0.5790 0.5101 0.6434 0.7150 0.6166 0.6944
TacTex 0.3362 0.4123 0.5743 0.4344 0.6271 0.5369 0.5546 0.6126 0.7238
PersianCat 0.4326 0.6200 0.5155 0.5925 0.7041 0.6686 0.6399 0.6446 0.7710
Mertacor 0.2677 0.3831 0.2947 0.3172 0.5068 0.4026 0.4479 0.4650 0.5503
Table 1: The payoff matrix of bilateral CAT games between CAT 2007 entries and MetroCat.
ulations and CAT 2007 games.
3.3 Ecological simulation
The payoff table for bilateral CAT games can be used to
approximate ecological dynamics for populations involving
more than 2 specialist types. The payoff of each special-
ist type for a certain population mixture is computed as the
expected payoff for this specialist assuming that each spe-
cialist obtains the payoff it would have obtained had it com-
peted one-on-one with each of the other specialists in the
mix. Under this assumption, Figure 2(a) and 2(b) show
how a population with an initial even distribution of spe-
cialists evolves over time when, as in [1], every specialist
plays against every other specialist in every generation in
bilateral games, and the number of specialists in any gener-
ation is proportional to the payoff achieved by that “breed”
of specialist in the previous generation.
Comparing Figure 2(a) with Figure 1(a) and Figure 2(b)
with Figure 1(b), shows that while the winning strategies are
the same, the ecological simulations based on multi-lateral
games converge much faster than those based on bilateral
games. This may be explained by the more epidemic ef-
fects of the strength of particular specialists in multi-lateral
games compared with bilateral games. Another notice-
able phenomenon is that PSUCAT performs much worse in
the simulations with bilateral games than those with multi-
lateral games, while jackaroo and IAMwildCAT do the
opposite. These discrepancies indicate that, as one might
expect, different game setups may lead to very different re-
sults. However, our results may be helpful to identify the
weakness in strategies by looking at the particular scenarios
in which a strategy performs poorly.
4. Conclusions and future work
This paper reports results of post-competition simula-
tions of entries in the First TAC Market Design Competition
based on both bilateral games and multi-lateral games. The
results basically agree with those in [12] and the result of the
actual tournament, and also unveil weaknesses of specialists
in particular scenarios, including the defeat of IAMwildCAT
by PersianCat in bilateral games and the poorer relative
performance of jackaroo in multi-lateral scenarios than in
bilateral scenarios.
Some simulations also consider an additional specialist,
MetroCat, which uses a history-based shout accepting pol-
icy that is derived from the GD trading strategy for double
auctions. MetroCat claims victories in all the scenarios
addressed in this paper, showing the importance of a shout
accepting policy in a market mechanism.
The bilateral games and multi-lateral games can be
viewed as the two ends of a spectrum of CAT games. The
aim of running simulations based on both configurations is
to explore whether the different competition configurations
lead to results that differ very much. It is hoped that if they
make no much difference — and our results suggest that
they do not — the low cost of bilateral games can be used
to approximate the games involving more different individ-
ual types and different population distributions.
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Figure 3: Payoffs of self and opponents in bilateral CAT games. On the outer circles starting from polar angle 0◦ lists the
9 specialists anti-clockwise : PersianCat (0◦), MANX (40◦), jackaroo (80◦), IAMwildCAT (120◦), MetroCat (160◦),
PSUCAT (200◦), CrocodileAgent (240◦), TacTex (280◦), and Mertacor (320◦). The radial coordinates of the 9 vertices
of a solid-line polygon represent the corresponding specialist’s payoffs against the 9 specialists respectively, and those of
a dashed-line polygon represent payoffs of its opponents respectively. The overlapping vertex of the two polygons in each
sub-figure is the self-play game for the particular specialist.
